Abstract:The primary purpose of corporate governance is to ensure transparency and equality between a corporation and its shareholders. This study examines the impact of board structure on Control Rights And Equitable Treatment Of Stockholder, four board characteristics (board composition, board size, board ownership and CEO duality) have been identified as possibly having an impact on Control Rights And Equitable Treatment Of Stockholder. Findings from the study show that there is strong positive association between board size and corporate financial performance. Evidence also exists that there is a positive association between outside directors sitting on the board and corporate financial performance. However, a negative association was observed between directors' stockholding and firm financial performance measures. In addition, the study reveals a negative association between ROE (measured as the proportion of Profit after tax to issued share capital)and CEO duality, while a strong negative association was observed between ROCE (measured as the proportion of profit after tax to issued share capital plus reserves)and CEO duality. The study suggests that large board size should be encouraged and the composition of outside directors as members of the board should be sustained and improved upon to enhance corporate financial performance.
Abstract:The primary purpose of corporate governance is to ensure transparency and equality between a corporation and its shareholders. This study examines the impact of board structure on Control Rights And Equitable Treatment Of Stockholder, four board characteristics (board composition, board size, board ownership and CEO duality) have been identified as possibly having an impact on Control Rights And Equitable Treatment Of Stockholder. Findings from the study show that there is strong positive association between board size and corporate financial performance. Evidence also exists that there is a positive association between outside directors sitting on the board and corporate financial performance. However, a negative association was observed between directors' stockholding and firm financial performance measures. In addition, the study reveals a negative association between ROE (measured as the proportion of Profit after tax to issued share capital)and CEO duality, while a strong negative association was observed between ROCE (measured as the proportion of profit after tax to issued share capital plus reserves)and CEO duality. The study suggests that large board size should be encouraged and the composition of outside directors as members of the board should be sustained and improved upon to enhance corporate financial performance. A corporate governance structure combines controls, policies and guidelines that drive the organization toward its objectives while also satisfying stakeholders' needs. A corporate governance structure is often a combination of various mechanisms.( Julie Davoren,Demand Media ,2016) Corporate implosions over the last ten years and the subsequent increased demand for continuous improvement and transparency in the boardroom have heightened the pace of change for boards worldwide despite the volume of the empirical work, there is no consensus on the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. Consequently, this lack of consensus has produced a variety of ideas (or mechanisms) on how corporate governance influence firm performance. .(Chandrajit Banerjee, Abhay Gupte,2015). In the case of Saudi, poor management and weak internal control systems account for some of the lapses in the operation of some corporate organizations. In addition, technical mismanagement involving inadequate polices, lack of standard practices, poor lending, mismatching of assets and liabilities, weak and ineffective internal control systems as well as poor and lack of strategic planning has bee prevalent in the Saudi corporate industry. Thus, the significance of this study is very high in an environment like Saudi, which is characterized by growing calls for effective corporate governance, particularly for public limited liability companies. Thus, we believe that this study should improve our understanding of the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in Saudi. Especially Control Rights And Equitable Treatment Of Stockholder. This study focuses on the Companies that are quoted on the Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE) to enhance the reliability of information obtained since they are required by law to publish their annual report and accounts. .(AdetunjiBabatunde, OlawoyeOlaniran, 2009) The scope of the study shall cover a period of five years. This is between 2011 and 2015. The choice of the period and the firms included in the analysis were guided by data availability considerations.
Statement of the Problem:
Boards of directors have been largely criticized for the decline in shareholders' wealth and corporate failure. They have been in the spotlight for the fraud cases that had resulted in the failure of major corporations, such as Enron, WorldCom and Global Crossing. In Saudia, a series of widelyl-publicized cases of accounting improprieties have been recorded (for example, Elmagle, Mobilycompany, integrated company, Al Baha). Some of the reasons stated for these corporate failures are the lack of vigilant oversight functions by the board of directors, the board relinquishing control to corporate managers who pursue their own self-interests and the board being remiss in its accountability to stakeholders. As a result, various corporate governance reforms have specifically emphasized on appropriate changes to be made to the board of directors in terms of its composition, structure and ownership configuration (Abidin, Kamal and Jusoff, 2009 ). Therefore, the study extends and contributes to the body of research using Saudian data to investigate the likely impact of board structure on Control Rights And Equitable Treatment Of Stockholder. The findings would be useful to stakeholders in the Saudian Stock Exchange (SSE) as it provides evidence on the relationship between board structure and firm's financial performance.
Objectives of the Study
This study specifically identified the following objective: to evaluate & examine & assess and investigate the extent to which board size & the number of outside directors & directors' stockholding and CEO duality affects control rights and equitable treatment of stockholder in Saudi.
Research Questions
The study attempts to find answers to the following specific question: to what extent does board size & the number of outside directors & directors' stockholding and CEO duality affect control rights and equitable treatment of stockholder? But measurement considerations of the study will be replaced control rights and equitable treatment of stockholder With corporate financial performance.
Research Hypotheses:
The following hypotheses were formulated to guide the researcher in finding answers to the research questions: H1: There is a negative relationship between Each of( board size& directors' stockholding& CEO duality) and corporate financial performance. H2: There is a positive relationship between proportion of outside directors sitting on the board and corporate financial performance. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses The Effects Of Board Structure on Corporate Financial Performance. while Section III captures empirical results and discussion.
Methodology:
This study uses a survey research design. Since this study is on board structure of quoted companies in Saudia, population of the study is made up of companies listed on the floor of the Saudian Stock Exchange (SSE). However, firms belonging to the financial services industry and regulated utility companies are excluded from the population. This is due to the special regulatory environment in which they operate. A sample consisting of companies listed on the SSE was considered a good representation of quoted companies in Saudia since the ultimate test of a sample design is how well it represents the characteristics of the population it purports to represent (Emory and Cooper, 2003) , (Vafeas and Theorodou, 1998; Singh and Davidson, 2003) . A sample of thirty (35) quoted companies for the period is between 2011 and 2015. Therefore, respondents cut across public limited companies that were listed on the floor of the SSE. Information relating to firm performance (ROE and ROCE) and board characteristics (board size, board composition, board ownership and CEO duality) was collected from the sampled company's annual reports.
Section II: The Effects Of Board Structure on Corporate Financial Performance
The application of the principles of corporate governance requirements in Saudi Arabia, According to Article 12 ,14 of the bylaw of corporate governance. Board size:"the company's system determines the number of board members, not less than three and no more than eleven.", Members non-executives on the board:"must be a majority of the members of the Board of Directors of the non-Member Executives"CEOduality:"prohibits combining the post of chairman of the board and any executive office company, such as the position of Managing Director or Chief Executive Officer or General Director" independent members of the board:"must not be less than the number of independent members of the Board of Directors for two, or a third of the members of the Board, whichever is more." , membership of corporate boards Other contributors:"we must Lists membership of the board of directors should not hold more than five joint-stock companies at the same time.
Board Composition and Corporate Financial Performance
Board composition refers to the number of independent nonexecutive directors on the board relative to the total number of directors. An independent non-executive director is defined as an independent director who has no affiliation with the firm except for their directorship (Clifford and Evans, 1997). the board should be comprised of executives and affiliated directors who are advice-oriented. A combined control / advice role is not possible. Executive and affiliated directors cannot monitor executives as they are financially tied to the company, and independent directors cannot advice executives as they do not have an in -depth knowledge of the company. (2006) summarize a number of views expressed in the literature which may justify this nonpositive relationship, such as that high proportion of nonexecutive directors may engulf the company in excessive monitoring, be harmful to companies as they may stifle strategic actions, lack real independence, and lack the business knowledge to be truly effective (Baysinger and Butler, 1985 ; Patton and Baker, 1987; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Goodstein, Gautum and Boeker, 1994).
Board Ownership and Corporate Financial Performance
Board Ownership reduces manager-shareholder conflicts in stock ownership by board members (both executive and nonexecutive). To the extent that executive board members own part of the firm, they develop shareholder-like interests and are less likely to engage in behaviour that is detrimental to shareholders. Therefore, managerial ownership is inversely related to agency conflicts between managers and shareholders.(OlayinkaMarte Uadiale,2010)There is no doubt that the structure of ownership of a firm and its internal/external effect has important impact on the capability of the firm to respond to external factors impinging on its performance.( AdetunjiBabatunde, OlawoyeOlaniran,( 2009),In contrast to this notion, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find no link between ownership structure and firm performance, and assert that there is little support for the divergence of interests between managers and shareholders. In empirical contrast to the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) findings, and in line with the beneficial effects of ownership, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find that firm performance first rises as ownership increases up to 5%, then falls as ownership increases up to 25% and then rises slightly at higher ownership levels. They support the theory that managers tend to allocate the firm's resources in their own best interests, which may conflict with those of shareholders.Research on the importance of ownership concentration in the UK has been sparse. Leech and Leahy (1991) find that profitability differences between ownership-controlled (closely-held) firms compared to management-controlled (diffusely-held) firms are only marginal. Such differences are unlikely to be economically meaningful. Moreover, Conyon and Leech (1994) examine, among other things, the mitigating role of ownership concentration in the pay-for-performance relationship. They find a weak relationship between pay and performance, while ownership is found to be insignificant in mitigating this relationship. and Donaldson and Davis (1991) argue that different types of directors add value to the company in different ways.This is considered to be a crucial characteristic of the board structure. Large boards could provide the diversity that would help companies to secure critical resources and reduce environmental uncertainties (Pfeffer, 1983 ; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; . But, as Yermack (1996) said, coordination, communication and decision-making problems increasingly impede company performance when the number of directors increases. Thus, as an extra member is included in the board, a potential trade-off exists between diversity and coordination. Jensen (1993) appears to support Lipton and Lorsch (1992) who recommend a number of board members between seven and eight. However, board size recommendations tend to be industry-specific.Overall, the empirical evidence indicates that there is no optimal board structure, which goes against the recommendation for independent boards found in codes around the world Dalton, 1993, 1994 Using a market return measure of performance, their results suggest that a large board is seen as less effective in monitoring performance, but when accounting returns are used, large boards seem to provide the firms with the diversity in contacts, experience and expertise needed to enhance performance. Yermack (1996) 
Board Size and Corporate Financial Performance
finds an inverse relationship between board size and firm value; in addition, financial ratios related to profitability and operating efficiency also appear to decline as board size grows. Finally, Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004) find that board size does not have any relation with firm performance.
CEO-Chairman Duality and Corporate Financial Performance
Board leadership has only two structures : separate persons as chairman and CEO , or one person as combined chair ‫ـ‬ CEO . Both structures have pros and cons . Donaldson and Davis ( 1991 ) argue that having an executive chairman will improve the clarity and speed of decision -making because boards will be less likely to oppose or confound executives . On the other hand , Cadbury ( 1992 , p. 21 ) argued against boards having an executive chairman because " …. it represents a considerable concentration of bower. " An executive chairman may subvert the company for their own purposes at the expense of stakeholders . Until recently, executive chairman were common in many countries, particular the US (Daily and Dalton, 1993; Donaldson and Davis, 1991 ) . However , having separate persons as chairman and CEO as well as a majority of independent directors is now favoured among policymakers . (Daily and Dalton, 1993; Solomon , 2007 ) . Under CEO-chairman duality, the CEO of a company plays the dual role of chairman of the board of directors. There are two schools of thought on CEO-chairman duality. Several researchers argue that CEO-chairman duality is detrimental to companies as the same person will be marking his "own examination papers". some researchers believe that since the CEO and chairman are the same person, the company will: (i) achieve strong, unambiguous leadership; (ii) achieve internal efficiencies through unity of command; (iii) eliminate potential for conflict between CEO and board chair, and (iv) avoid confusion of having two public spokespersons addressing firm stakeholders (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991) . Consistent with these arguments, Cannella and Lubatkin (1993) report a positive link between a dual leadership structure and financial performance, Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) find a negative market reaction upon the announcement of splitting roles, and Dedman and Lin (2002) find no evidence of significant abnormal returns upon the announcement of splitting roles in the post-Cadbury period, and Simpson and Gleason (1999) report that companies that combine the roles the CEO and chairman are less likely to be financially distressed. A closer look at the empirical evidence reveals that the relationship between CEO-chairman duality and company performance is mixed and inconclusive. On the other hand, other researchers believe that Separation of duties will lead to: (i) avoidance of CEO entrenchment; (ii) increase of board monitoring effectiveness; (iii) availability of board chairman to advise the CEO, and (iv) establishment of independence between board of directors and corporate management (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Rechner and Dalton, 1991).
SectionIII empirical results and discussion 3.1 Dependent and Independent Variables
Dependent variable of the study is Control Rights And Equitable Treatment Of Stockholder, but consideration measurement the Dependent variable of the study is corporate financial performance which is represented by ROE (measured as the proportion of Profit after tax to issued share capital) and ROCE (measured as the proportion of profit after tax to issued share capital plus reserves). The independent variables are board size, board composition, board ownership and CEO duality.
Statistical Analyses
For the purpose of empirical analysis, this study uses descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation analysis and linear multiple regression as the underlying statistical tests. The regression analysis is performed on the dependent variable, CORPERF, to test the relationship between the independent variables (board structure characteristics). The regression model utilized to test the relationship between the board characteristics and corporate performance is as follows: CORPERF = β0 + β1BSIZE + β2BCOMP + β3 BOSHIP + β4 CEO + e Where: β0 = Intercept coefficient β1 = Coefficient for each of the independent variables BSIZE = Number of directors on the board BCOMP = Proportion of outside directors sitting on the board BOSHIP = Proportion of total equity owned by executive and non-executive directors respectively. CEO = Value zero (0) if the same person occupies the position of the chairman and the chief executive and one (1) for otherwise.
Data Analysis and Presentation of Results
This section of the study is devoted to presenting the results of the analysis performed on the data collected to test the propositions made in the study and answer the research questions. Analyses were carried out with the aid of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences, (SPSS Version 22.0). Table 4 .1 shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the study. The mean ROE of the sampled firms is S2 and the mean ROCE is N0.11. The results indicate that for every S100 invested on equity there is a return of S2. In the same vein, return on every S100 of capital employed is N0.11. The average board size of the 35 firms used in this study is 9, while the proportion of the outside directors sitting on the board is 33%. The result also indicates that the proportion of total equity owned by executive and non-executive directors is 40% .The result above also reveals that 100% of the sampled firms have separate persons occupying the posts of the chief executive and the board chair.
Regression Analysis
A Pearson correlation analysis is performed on the variables to check for the degree of multicollinearity among the variables. The results are shown in Table 4 .2, ROE is positively correlated with board size and is significant at (0.008). Similar results appear for board composition though not significant (0.714). However, ROE has a negative relationship with board ownership and CEO duality but not significant. The results also show that a negative and significant (0.001) relationship exists between board composition and board ownership. Table 4 .3, indicates that ROCE is positively correlated with tow of the board structure variables (board size and board composition), A negative correlation is observed between ROCE and board ownership though not significant (0.974). A negative correlation is also observed between ROCE and CEO duality Board ownership also has a negative and significant (0.001) relationship with board composition. A negative correlation is also observed between board ownership and CEO duality. Tables 4.4a and 5.5a present the model summary. The R2 value, which indicates the explanatory power of the independent variables, is 0.487 and 0.384 respectively. This means that %48 of the variation in ROE is explained by the variation in the independent variables, while 35.6% of the variation in ROCE is
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explained by the variation in the independent variables. From the output of the analysis in Tables 4.4b and 4 .5b, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) returns significant p-values of 0.003 and 0.055 for ROE and ROCE respectively. This shows that the explanatory variables are linearly related to CORPERF and the model seems to have some validity. Table 4 .6 shows the results of the coefficient estimates with ROE as dependent variable. Board size are significant at p-value < 0.05. This indicates a positive relationship with ROE. Board Ownership is significant at p-value < 0.10. Board composition is not significant at either level. Table 4 .7 shows the results of the coefficient estimates with ROCE as dependent variable. Three of the board structure variables (board size, board composition and CEO duality) are not significant at p-value < 0.05. Only board ownership is significant at p-value < 0.05. This means that there is a relationship between CEO duality and ROCE.
Conclusion
The aim of this study was to empirically examine the impact of board structure on Control Rights And Equitable Treatment Of Stockholder ,consideration measurement the impact of board structure on corporate financial performance in Saudian quoted companies. In achieving this aim, the study obtained data on variables which were believed to have relationship with corporate financial performance and board structure. These variables included ROE, ROCE, BSIZE, BCOMP, BOSHIP, CEO-DUALITY. On the basis of these variables, hypotheses were postulated.
Results from the study indicate that there is strong positive association between board size and corporate financial performance. This is consistent with the findings of Dehaene et al. (2001) . to mention a few. A negative association was observed between directors' stockholding and corporate financial performance. In addition the study reveals a negative association between ROE and CEO duality, also a strong negative association is observed between ROCE and CEO duality.The study also reveals a positive association between outside directors sitting on the board and corporate financial performance The result is consistent with previous studies (Dehaene et 
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